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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT TERM IN PERSPECTIVE:
AN OVERVIEW
During its 1973 term, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals handed
down several decisions that promise to have a significant impact on
the practice of law within this circuit and throughout the federal
court system. Matters of particular concern to the court included the
scope of federal jurisdiction, limitations on freedom of speech, the
mandates of the civil rights statutes, and the operation of due process
within the field of criminal law. The court also interpreted various
federal statutes, governmental regulations, and private contractual
provisions. The following survey of Fourth Circuit cases is intended
as a general guide to these developments.'
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A recurring issue faced by the Fourth Circuit was the proper deli-
neation between federal and state court jurisdiction. Much of the
court's attention in this area centered on the doctrine of abstention
and specifically on the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Younger v. Harris2 and Mitchum v. Foster.3 The court also noted
certain limitations on the exercise of federal and state jurisdiction
and commented on the precedential value of its own memorandum
decisions.
A. Guidelines for Abstention in the Fourth Circuit
In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that there may be
"exceptional circumstances" which will prompt the federal court sys-
tem to disregard its long-standing policy of non-interference in state
criminal proceedings.4 Injunctive relief aginst the state proceeding
will be granted only upon a showing by the defendant of irreparable
injury which is both great and immediate.5 The Court subsequently
'Not all of the cases decided by the Fourth Circuit during this term have been
included in this survey. The description of fact situations and the reporting of specific
holdings are necessarily brief due to the number of cases involved. Cases of major
significance are also discussed in depth in student articles found elsewhere in this issue
and to which the reader is directed in the notes.
2401 U.S. 37 (1971).
3407 U.S. 225 (1972).
'401 U.S. at 53.
The Younger court consciously chose not to confront the federal anti-injunction
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held in Mitchum v. Foster that the exercise of discretion in granting
the injunction must be based on considerations of "equity, comity
and federalism."'
The Fourth Circuit in Lynch v. Snepp7 applied the principles set
out in Younger and Mitchum. The case was an appeal from the dis-
trict court's grant of a preliminary injunction against the enforce-
ment of a state order which restricted access to public schools in
Mecklenburg, North Carolina. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
exercise of federal jurisdiction was proper because the action in
Snepp, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was an exception to the
federal anti-injunction statute.' However, the court held that the
district court had exceeded its equitable discretion when it granted
the preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the state
court's order.'
The central question in Snepp was whether the Supreme Court's
guidelines for the granting of injunctive relief in criminal proceedings
should be followed in civil cases.'0 The Fourth Circuit concluded that
the test for abstention should be the same in both situations." To
determine when a federal court should act to enjoin a state proceed-
ing, the court formulated a standard based upon the following consid-
erations: (1) whether a state proceeding is pending and (2) whether
equitable relief is appropriate. According to this standard, when no
state proceedings are actually pending, the notions of comity and
federalism that restrained the Supreme Court in Younger do not
apply. Conversely, if there is already litigation in state courts involv-
ing the same parties, those notions can only be overcome by a strong
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), which prohibits an injunction against state proceed-
ings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress." Rather, it based its decision
on the equitable grounds which justify federal intervention, stating that an injunction
is appropriate where there is a threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights that
cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single prosecution. 401 U.S. at 46.
'407 U.S. at 243.
7472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973).
'Id. at 771. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), discussed in text accompa-
nying note 5 supra.
9472 F.2d at 776.
"'Id. at 771. The Fourth Circuit was on new ground in attempting to establish
guidelines for situations involving state civil proceedings. Younger was set in a criminal
context, and the issue was never reached in Mitchum.
"472 F.2d at 773, 774-75 n.5. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (White, J., dissent-
ing); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36, 55 n.2 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also
Note, Federal Court Intervention in State Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 207, 216-18
(1972), for discussion of arguments for and against an equally stringent standard in
civil cases.
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showing of the need for federal intervention.'2 The party seeking the
injunction must assert the two basic prerequisites to obtaining equi-
table relief. There must be a showing that he will suffer irreparable
injury which is both great and immediate and also that he has no
adequate remedy at law. 3 The court noted a third requirement appl-
icable to the issuance of preliminary injunctions: the case must be
one in which the outcome on the merits is "reasonably free from
doubt.""4
The Fourth Circuit also dealt with two cases falling within more
settled areas of the doctrine of abstention. In Wohl v. Keene,5 the
court reiterated the widely-held opinion that abstention is not appro-
priate solely to avoid the decision of difficult state law questions,
regardless of whether the plaintiff has a "plain, adequate and com-
plete" remedy in the state courts.' 6 On the other hand, in AFA Dis-
tributing Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co.,17 abstention was found justified
where a state court decision on an ambiguous or previously uninter-
preted state statute could have conceivably avoided a decision on a
federal constitutional question.'"
'See Joseph v. Blair, 482 F.2d 575, 578 (4th Cir. 1973), for the court's discussion
of its holding in Snepp.
'-472 F.2d at 774, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
"1472 F.2d at 776. The Fourth Circuit, citing Younger, also held that the "chilling
effect" of state prosecutions on first amendment freedoms does not by itself justify
federal intervention. But see Greenmount Sales, Inc. v. Davila, 479 F.2d 591 (4th Cir.
1973) (raid on an adult bookstore and confiscation of allegedly obscene items). The
court held it was proper for the district court to have exercised its jurisdiction over a
first amendment claim regarding the seizing of duplicate copies since it had properly
deferred to the state criminal courts by refusing to enjoin pending or future prosecu-
tions based on the nature of the evidence seized. See also Note, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
385 (1972).
13476 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1973).
"Accord, Meridith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); Martin v. State
Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1967). The Fifth Circuit reached the
opposite result in United States Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964). See
the critiques of Delaney in Comment, Abstention Under Delaney: A Current
Appraisal, 49 TEX. L. REv. 247 (1971); Comment, Recent Developments in the Doctrine
of Abstention, 1966 DUKE L.J. 102; Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity
Suits: "Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964).
"1470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1973). For an in-depth discussion of this case see Note,
Federal Court Abstention in Diversity Actions Involving Unsettled State Law: Avoid-
ing Constitutional Adjudication and Interference with State Affairs, 31 WASH. & LE
L. REv. 186 (1974) (this issue).
'This is a case of absention under the Pullman doctrine, from the case of Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Such abstention will not be ordered,
however, where the relevant state law is settled, Public Utilities Comm'n v. United
States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); nor where it is clear that the state statute is unconstitu-
19741
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B. The Limitations of Federal and State Jurisdiction
The Fourth Circuit also encountered jurisdictional questions of a
constitutional and statutory nature. In the following cases, the issue
was not whether the federal courts should abstain but rather whether
they were required to do so by law.
The Fourth Circuit placed strict limitations on the jurisdiction of
the federal courts in hearings on motions made pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.11 That statute provides that a federal prisoner seeking to
challenge his federal sentence may move for a hearing on the merits
in the district court that sentenced him in order to determine whether
his sentence was rendered on the basis of improper considerations. 2
If the court finds for the petitioner it may vacate the judgment.2' In
Brown v. United States, 2 the Court of Appeals was asked to vacate
the sentence of a federal prisoner who claimed that in setting his
sentence the district court had been improperly influenced by three
allegedly invalid state convictions. However, the court refused to do
so until those prior convictions had been overturned at the state level.
The Fourth Circuit considered the petitioner's motion to be a collat-
tional no matter how it may be construed by the state courts, Wisconsin v. Constanti-
neau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
1928 US.C. 2255 (1970) provides in pertinent part the procedure for a federal
prisoner to vacate his federal sentence:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act
of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States . . .or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclu-
sively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney,
grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court
finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to
collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement
of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the
judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
" Two of the possibly improper considerations included in the statute are that the
court did not have jurisdiction to impose the challenged sentence and that the sentence
was unconstitutionally obtained.
21lSee note 18 supra.
L1483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973).
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eral attack on the state convictions and held that they must first be
invalidated by the courts which imposed them before relief from the
federal sentence could be sought under § 2255.
With its decision in Dawkins v. Craig,2 the Fourth Circuit
adopted the view that the eleventh amendment 2 prohibits suits for
recovery of backpayments of funds due under the Aid to Dependent
Children program which have been illegally withheld. Because the
action involved the appropriation of funds from the state treasury,
the court interpreted it as a suit against the state, and therefore not
within the jurisdiction of federal courts since it violated the state's
immunity under the eleventh amendment.2 The Second Circuit had
previously taken this position;6 however, jurisdiction was exercised
by the Seventh Circuit in a similar case.Y The issue of the eleventh
amendment's applicability to suits for retroactive welfare payments
will soon be resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Edelman
v. Jordan.Y
The circumstances that require the jurisdictional amount in ex-
cess of $10,000 under 28 U.S.C. § 133129 and that allow mandamus
-483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973). For an in-depth discussion of this case see Note,
Dawkins v. Craig: The Eleventh Amendment and Suits For Retroactive Welfare
Payvments, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 149 (1974) (this issue).
"'U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides in part:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State....
The amendment was construed as barring suits against a state brought by its own
citizens without its consent. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
nThe court, relying on Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), stated that suits
against state officials to enjoin future wrongful withholdings were permissible. In
Young, the Supreme Court took the position that an injunction against a state official
is proper where the official is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional state law. In such
a case "the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury
of the complainants is a proceeding without the authority of, and one which does not
affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity." Id. at 159. See C. WRIGHT.
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHTI. See
generally Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment: Lower Court Mterpreta-
tion and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEO. L.J. 1473 (1973).
:Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 92 (1973).
rJordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Edelman v.
Weaver, 412 U.S. 937 (1973).
fId.
2128 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States.
1974]
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under 28 U.S.C. §136130 were discussed by the court in two cases
involving actions against commanders of military posts based on al-
leged deprivations of first amendment rights. The court provided
little clarification on the proper scope of jurisdiction in such instan-
ces. In the first case, McGaw v. Farrow,3' the court affirmed dismissal
on the ground that the required jurisdiction was lacking. In so hold-
ing, it quoted the language of the Supreme Court in Lynch v. House-
hold Finance Corp. :32 "[I]n suits against federal officials for alleged
deprivations of constitutional rights, it is necessary to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction."3 The
court also held that the case was not appropriate for a mandamus
proceeding because the petitioners had failed to show two elements
necessary for jurisdiction under § 1361: (1) that they had a "clear
and certain" claim and (2) that the federal officer had an affirmative
duty not to interfere with that right .3 A month later the court, in
Burnett v. Tolson,' reversed a lower court's dismissal of a suit involv-
ing a similar first amendment complaint on the grounds that the suit,
though failing to meet the requirement of jurisdictional amount, did
come within mandamus jurisdiction. 6 The court considered the fact
that no other adequate remedy was available in determining that
mandamus was proper.
In Frinks v. North Carolina,37 the Fourth Circuit encountered the
seldomly invoked civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443.38
-1"28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action
in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff.
3'472 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1973).
-405 U.S. 538 (1972).
' Id. at 547.
3472 F.2d at 957. See Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972).
474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973).
31For a discussion of the effect of the 1962 amendment to § 1361 on sovereign
immunity and of the need for independent jurisdictional grounds for proceedings in
the nature of mandamus, see WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 22. The dissent in Burnett was
based on the holding in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
-'468 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1973).
28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1970) provides:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embrac-
ing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the
courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Under that statute a defendant in a state criminal proceeding may
have the case removed to a federal court if he is denied or cannot
enforce his civil rights in the state court. The petitioners complained
(1) that the state criminal charge of rioting had been brought to
punish them for having exercised their rights under the public accom-
modations section of the Civil Rights Act of 19640 and (2) that they
could not enforce these rights in the courts of the State of North
Carolina. The Court of Appeals ruled that removal was not appropri-
ate where it was impossible to "clearly predict from the operation of
an explicit state law that federal rights [would] inevitably be de-
nied" the petitioners. 0
The Fourth Circuit also dealt with the constitutional limits of in
personam jurisdiction under the Virginia and South Carolina long-
arm statutes. In Ajax v. J. F. Zook, Inc.,"' the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered the application of Va. Code Ann. § 8-81.2(a)4 2 to a single trans-
action-in this instance, the defendant's act of shipping its product
into the state. Although the Court of Appeals had previously held
that the section in question, § 8-81.2(a)(1), was not a "single act"
statute,43 the court overruled itself on that point in light of a recent
rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the
jurisdiction thereof; ....
342 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1970) provides that:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities . . . of any place of public accommodation
. ..without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion or creed.
"1468 F.2d at 643.
"41 U.S.L.W. 2339 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 1972).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2 (Cum. Supp. 1973) reads in part:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the
person's
(1) Transacting any business in this State;
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this State;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this State;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission out-
side this State if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this State;
(5) Causing injury in this State to any person by breach of warranty
expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this State
when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume,
or be affected by the goods in this State, provided that he also regu-
larly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or con-
sumed or services rendered in this State. . ..
13Haynes v. Carr, 427 F.2d 700, 704, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
1974]
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decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia holding to the contrary."
In Zook, the Fourth Circuit refused to hold that the defendant had
transacted any business in Virginia even under the state construction
of § 8-81.2(a)(1).15 However, the court did find jurisdiction proper
under § 8-81.2(a)(5" on the grounds that the nonresident defendant
manufacturer expected that the product would be used in Virginia
and had also derived substantial revenues from the use of the prod-
uct. Consequently, the court ruled that sufficient contact existed to
satisfy due process in an action for breach of warranty.1
7
Lee v. Walworth Valve Co.48 also involved an action against an
out-of-state manufacturer based on breach of warranty. In this
case, the single tortious act took place at sea. Unlike Ajax, the
defendant manufacturer in Walworth had solicited orders within the
state although all of the salesmen involved in this activity were head-
quartered elsewhere. The issue faced by the court was what combina-
tion of defendant's contacts with the forum state coupled with the
degree of the forum state's interest in the litigation amounted to
"doing business" adequate to allow the court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction. The court found that the defendant's contacts would
have been sufficient to justify jurisdiction had the action arisen
within the state. Therefore, because the accident did not occur in any
other state and because the state had a "paternal interest" in helping
the plaintiff recover in order that she and her dependents did not
become public charges, the court held that jurisdiction in South Car-
olina was warranted.
4 9
C. Construction 6f Federal Rules
In addition to jurisdictional matters, the Fourth Circuit dealt with
problems which involved the proper construction of various Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The cases noted in this section concern the
motion for more definite statement, intervention, and discovery.'
The Fourth Circuit held in Hodgson v. Virginia Baptist Hosp.5'
"Kolbe v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971).
1 41 U.S.L.W. 2339 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 1972).
'"See note 42 supra.
"On similar facts the Fifth Circuit applied basically the same legal theory and
came to the opposite conclusion. Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d 723
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S. October 9, 1973).
'482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973).
'
9
Id. at 301.
"Maintenance of a class action under Rule 23 has been included in the procedural
discussion relating to civil rights actions. See text accompanying notes 105-116 infra.
:1482 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1973).
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that Rule 12(e),52 the motion for more definite statement, should be
read in conjunction with the liberal requirements of Rule 811 relating
to the elements of a claim. Because the emphasis of Rule 8 is on
notice, the complaint need only provide information sufficient to ena-
ble the other party to prepare an answer, rather than present all of
the facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim.54
Francis v. Chamber of Commerce of the United States55 involved
intervention under Rule 24.56 The court there affirmed denial of inter-
vention by right on the ground that there had not been a timely
petition. It also held that permissive intervention57 was not appropri-
ate where the plaintiff failed to show a practical impairment in his
ability to bring a subsequent action.
In a suit for damages arising out of an automobile accident, the
Fourth Circuit commented upon the discovery, under Rule 26(b) (3),5s
;Fio. R. COv. P. 12(e) provides in part:
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague
or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement ...
3Rule 8(a) requires only that a pleading specify the grounds upon which jurisdic-
tion rests, contain a brief statement showing the pleader's right to relief, and make a
demand for judgment.
"See WRIHIT, supra note 25, §§ 66, 68.
5481 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1973).
5 %FE). R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides in part:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action:
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest ....
Appellant Chamber sought to intervene in an action to enjoin the State of Maryland
from dispensing welfare benefits to strikers in a labor dispute. The issue was raised
that the influence on the judiciary of a judgment in favor of the strikers would preju-
dice the Chamber's claim in a subsequent action. The court discounted this argument
since the Chamber could protect itself sufficiently by appearing as amicus curiae. See
Wright § 75 at 330, nn.25, 26.
7FEo. R. Civ. P. 24(b) reads in part:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action . . . (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. . ..
''Rule 26(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
[A[ party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable. . . and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including his attorney, . . . insurer, or agent) only
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
1974]
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of reports written by insurance agents based on statements of parties
and witnesses made to the agents immediately after an accident. The
suit in McDougall v. Dunn59 was not brought until two years after the
accident, and, in dictum, the question was raised as to whether there
was sufficient anticipation of future litigation at the time the reports
were made to warrant their classification as "work product." The
court expressed the opinion that this material should not be consid-
ered work product and therefore ought to be discoverable simply upon
a showing of relevance.60 The court did hold that even if the insurance
reports fell within the protection of trial preparation, they should be
made available to this plaintiff, who, in the opinion of the court, met
the conditions of "substantial need" and "undue hardship," as speci-
fied in Rule 26.
In addition to clarifying the federal procedural rules, the Court of
Appeals instructed the Bar as to preferred procedure before its own
bench, and specifically as to the citation of memorandum decisions
to the court. Because such decisions are unpublished and access to
them is unequal, the court held in Jones v. Superintendent"' that it
would be inequitable to treat them as precedent for purposes of stare
decisis. Henceforth, any prior memorandum decision in conflict with
a subsequently published opinion will be considered overruled.2
II. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
A. Freedom of Speech
As a condition of employment, an employee of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency signed a secrecy agreement that required Agency ap-
proval prior to publication of all material written by him both during
and after his employment. After his resignation, the former employee
challenged the constitutional validity of this restriction upon his first
amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit held in United States v.
Marchetti3 that this agreement did not constitute invalid prior cen-
sorship in derogation of the employee's right to freedom of speech as
long as his submissions of material for approval were acted upon
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means.
'468 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1972).
"Id. at 473.
"1465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972).
21d. at 1094.
"466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
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promptly, and approval was withheld only with regard to publication
of information that was classified and had not been placed in the
public domain by prior disclosure. 4 The court structured its decision
around three major points: (1) freedom of speech and of the press are
not absolute; 65 (2) the government has a right to secrecy;66 and (3)
secrecy agreements with employees provide a reasonable means for
government agencies to protect internal secrets.
7
Chitwood v. Fenster,5 another Fourth Circuit case that involved
freedom of speech, held that a recent Supreme Court decision, Perry
v. Sindermann," precludes governmentally financed educational in-
stitutions from terminating the employment of non-tenured teachers
for openly voicing general criticism of public agencies and policies.
70
The court held that a teacher who claimed that the non-renewal of
his contract of employment resulted from "participation in anti-war
and other protest movements, as well as public statements critical of
the state-supported college and its officials' was entitled to a hear-
ing in order to determine whether the termination of his employment
resulted solely from activity protected by the first amendment.1
2
In the area of freedom of speech and assembly, the Fourth Circuit
held that by indiscriminate rental of a public school auditorium to
various groups during non-school hours on a "first-come, first-served"
basis, a school board had partially dedicated that auditorium as a
neutral forum for the exercise of the first amendment rights of free-
dom of speech, association and assembly. 73 The court held in
National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers74 that denial of the
use of this auditorium on the ground that the group wishing to rent
the facility maintained discriminatory membership policies consti-
tuted an invalid prior restraint on the exercise of the first amendment
rights to freedom of speech and association. 5
"Id. at 1317.
"Id. at 1313.
"Id. at 1315.
"Id. at 1316.
-468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972).
11408 U.S. 593 (1972).
7a468 F.2d at 361.
7Id. at 360.
7'See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1963); James v. Board of
Education, 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
,'National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973).
71d. For an in-depth discussion of this case see Note, First Amendment Rights and
the Use of Public Facilities by Private Groups with Discriminatory Membership Poli-
cies: National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 107
(1974) (this issue).
7WId. at 1016.
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B. Freedom of the Press
Despite the newspaper's racially segregationist editorial, staffing,
and advertising policies, the Fourth Circuit in Joyner v. Whiting7 6
held that a university president's irrevocable withdrawal of financial
support from an official student newspaper constituted an abridge-
ment of freedom of the press in violation of the first amendment.
7 7
The court ruled that the president's action could not be sustained by
arguing that the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
19648 barred a state agency from spending state funds to discourage
racial integration of the university. 79 The Fourth Circuit interpreted
the first amendment as permitting state agencies to "spend money
to publish the positions they take on controversial subjects,"80 and
that therefore the newspaper's editorial stance constituted permissi-
ble "state advocacy." 1 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted
that the editor of the newspaper did not reject articles opposed to his
editorial policy, and there was no proof that the editorial policy of the
paper incited violence or the harassment of white students and fac-
ulty. The court did suggest, however, that the discriminatory staffing
and advertising policies might be enjoinable.
In a case involving freedom of the press on the secondary school
level, the Fourth Circuit in Baughman v. Freienmuth2 examined the
constitutionality of a school board regulation which required that any
student publication must first be submitted to the principal prior to
its distribution. The regulation provided that the principal could
disapprove the distribution if he judged that the publication con-
tained libelous or obscene language, advocated illegal actions, or was
grossly insulting to any group or individual. In invalidating the regu-
lation the court held that it constituted a prior restraint in violation
of the student's first amendment rights.8 3 The court found the regula-
tion to be lacking a "procedural safeguard of specified and reasonably
short period of time in which the principal must act,"" and "the
regulation fails to provide for the contingency of the principal's fail-
ure to act within a specified time, i.e., whether upon such failure the
, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
771d. at 460.
7142 U.S.C. § 2000(a) et seq. (1970).
'ld. at 461-62.
,'qd. at 461.
1"d. at 461-62.
' 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
131d. at 1348. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'"478 F.2d at 1348. See also Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1971).
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material could be distributed. ' ' , 5 The court further ruled that a regu-
lation requiring prior submission of material before distribution must
contain "narrow, objective, and reasonable standards by which the
material will be judged."86 The court found terms such as libelous and
obscene sufficiently precise to be understood by high school stu-
dents. 7
In rejecting allegations of deprivations of the rights of freedom of
speech and press, the Fourth Circuit in Greenmount Sales, Inc. v.
Davila" held that the first amendment does not require an adversary
hearing prior to government seizures of allegedly obscene materials
as evidence in criminal prosecutions if only single copies of the mate-
rials are seized."8 The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,"0 in holding that such a seizure was
not prohibited "as a prior restraint on the circulation and dissemi-
nation of books in violation of the constitutional restrictions against
abridgement of freedom of speech and press."'"
III. CIVIL RIGHTS
The Fourth Circuit was faced with several cases arising under the
federal civil rights statutes. In the course of its decisions in this area,
"478 F.2d at 1348, citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
"478 F.2d at 1350, citing Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
1478 F.2d at 1351. The court rested its decision upon four propositions of law:
(a) Secondary school children are within the protection of the first
amendment, although their rights are not coextensive with those of
adults.
(b) Secondary school authorities may exercise reasonable prior re-
straint upon the exercise of student's first amendment rights..
(c) Such prior restraints must contain precise criteria sufficiently
spelling out what is forbidden so that a reasonably intelligent student
will know what he may write and what he may not write.
(d) A prior restraint system, even though precisely defining what
may not be written, is nevertheless invalid unless it provides for:
1. A definition of "distribution" and its application to dif-
ferent kinds of materials;
2. Prompt approval or disapproval of what is submitted;
3. Specification of the effect of failure to act promptly;
and,
4. An adequate and prompt appeals procedure.
Id.
'479 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 594.
'378 U.S. 205, 209 (1964).
"Greenmount Sales, Inc. v. Davila, 479 F.2d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 1973), quoting A
Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 209 (1964).
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the court elaborated on the prerequisites for actions initiated under
42 U.S.C. § 198392 and the granting of attorney fees in civil rights
actions. Since many of these cases came before the court as class
actions, they posed procedural problems as well as substantive issues
relating to school desegregation plans, discrimination in employ-
ment, and suits for damages against state officials.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The court found "action under color of' state law for the purpose
of obtaining relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in situations involving
temporary state law enforcement officers,93 police fraternal organiza-
tions,94 and housing projects operated under federal housing legisla-
tion.9 5 In Joy v. Daniels," a tenant brought an action challenging her
threatened eviction, without cause, from an apartment complex that
had been constructed under the National Housing Act.97 The defen-
dant landlord received mortgage benefits as well as rent supplements
from the Federal Housing Administration. The court held that this
federal funding and the landlord's use of state eviction procedure
constituted sufficient state involvement to render the eviction at-
tempt "action under color of' state law. 98
The more significant portion of the decision in Joy dealt with the
elements of the plaintiff's claim to relief under the fourteenth amend-
ment. To obtain relief pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must have
suffered the deprivation of a right secured by Congress and the laws
of the United States.99 The tenant claimed that she should have been
9'42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
'"Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973).
"Johnson v. Capitol City Lodge No. 74, 477 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1973).
"Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
961d.
'1National Housing Act § 221(d)(3); 12 U.S.C. § 1715(1)(d)(3) (1970).
"479 F.2d at 1239. See also Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp.
1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), which involved an action commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
in which it was held that private action which denied blacks the same right to make
contracts as white citizens was sufficient for jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of
1866.
"Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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afforded procedural due process in any eviction attempt after the
expiration of her lease. After stating that procedural due process
under the fourteenth amendment applies only to the deprivation of
liberty and property, the Fourth Circuit examined the Supreme
Court's holdings in Goldberg v. Kelly,' 0 Board of Regents v. Roth'0 '
and Perry v. Sindermann"'2 for a definition of property interest. 3 The
court concluded that a tenant in such quasi-public housing projects
had "a property right or entitlement to continue occupancy until
there exists a cause to evict other than the mere expiration of the
lease,"''0 and therefore such tenants must be extended the safeguards
of due process.
B. Procedural Difficulties in Civil Rights Class Actions
A few of the civil rights suits before the Fourth Circuit encoun-
tered procedural difficulties on the district court level relating to their
maintenance as class actions. The Fourth Circuit responded by set-
ting out in some detail the mechanics for administering a class action.
Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.'15 and Moss v. Lane Co.'°0 came from
the same district court and involved essentially identical issues: the
use of advisory juries and the ability of an individual to maintain a
class action even though his personal claim is found to be moot or
without merit.' 7 Although the Fourth Circuit did not find the use of
advisory juries' 8 in discrimination cases to be error where the judge
made separate findings of fact, it declared that such use would be
disfavored because advisory juries should be "restricted . . . to the
exceptional case where there are peculiar and unique circumstances
supporting its use."'0 9 However, the court did not elaborate on the
circumstances that warrant the use of advisory juries.
'397 U.S. 254 (1970).
'408 U.S. 564 (1972).
t-408 U.S. 593 (1972).
'479 F.2d at 1239-40. The Fourth Circuit had previously dealt with the issue of
what constituted a protected property in a teacher dismissal case. Johnson v. Fraley,
470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
'479 F.2d at 1241. See Note, Procedural Due Process in Governmental-Subsidized
Housing, 86 HAav. L. Rv. 880 (1973).
'471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972).
'471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973). Use of an advisory jury is provided by FED. R. Civ.
P. 39(c).
1°'The court also held in each case that it was not error to refuse to admit Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission records into evidence. 471 F.2d at 15; 471 F.2d
at 856. Accord, Smith v. University Scvs., 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972).
'See FED. R. Civ. P.39(c) for the federal rule pertaining to advisory juries.
'471 F.2d at 855 (dictum).
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In Cox the district court had dismissed the class action upon
finding that the individual plaintiff's claim was without merit and
concluded that he could not properly represent the claims of the
class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, citing several
cases as authority for the proposition that "it would be inappropriate
• . . to permit a party to prosecute an action on behalf of a class
which he has already been adjudged not to be a member."1 0 However,
in Moss the Fourth Circuit reconsidered this proposition and held
that the trial court had erred in dismissing the class action subse-
quent to its ruling that the plaintiff's individual claim for relief was
without merit.' The Court of Appeals was persuaded that once the
plaintiff had been determined to be a competent representive of the
class, the merits of the class claim were properly before the trial
court. Regardless of whether the representative prevailed on his per-
sonal claim, the district court was bound by its initial determination,
pursuant to Rule 23(a), that the claims presented were entitled to
class action treatment and that the class was adequately represented
by the individual plaintiff. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit re-
manded the case for a finding on the merits of the class claim inde-
pendent of the decision on the representative's individual com-
plaint."2
The issue of precisely when and how the initial determination
under Rule 23(a)" 3 must be made as to whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class he allegedly represents was raised in Carracter
v. Morgan. ' There the court decided that the plaintiff not only had
to show that the suit met the prerequisites of the class action rule but
also had the duty to bring the matter of the class action to the atten-
tion of the court for determination by order as to whether it was to
be so maintained. ' 15 The court did not specify whether the latter duty
required more than mere notification in the complaint of the plain-
tiff's intention to prosecute a class action."1
6
"471 F.2d at 15.
"'471 F.2d at 855.
"ld. Accord, Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.
1972).
"'Rule 23(a) generally requires "that the persons constituting the class must be
so numerous that it is impractical to bring them all before the court, and the named
representatives must be such as will fairly insure adequate representation of them all."
Wimrr, supra note 25, § 72, at 308.
"'No. 71-2175 (4th Cir. July 13, 1973).
"Id. at 4 of the slip opinion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) provides in part: As soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court
shall determine by order whether it is to be maintained.
"'The court cited Adice v. Mather, 56 F.R.D. 492 (D. Colo. 1972), in support of
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C. Substantive Aspects of Civil Rights Class Actions
Procedural problems relating to class action maintenance were
greatly overshadowed by the substantive issues of the civil rights
suits. School desegregation was a primary judicial concern. In Medley
v. School Board of Danville,'7 a court-ordered desegregation plan was
challenged by black parents on the ground that it reflected the exist-
ing geographical pattern of black and white neighborhoods and there-
fore failed to produce a genuinely unitary school system."' The court
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education"' to the effect that although every
school need not reflect the racial composition of the school system as
a whole, the school authorities still must satisfy the courts that school
assignments do not result from a past history of state-enforced segre-
gation. 20 The court also affirmed its prior holding that "under proper
circumstances the assignment of the primary grades to neighborhood
schools is not per se unacceptable,"'' 21 but cautioned that "such as-
signments must rest upon specific findings which demonstrate that
no other plan affording greater integration is practicable."' Citing
the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. School Commissioners of
Mobile County,"2 the court held that a lack of transportation facili-
ties should not be controlling in the face of a mandate to formulate a
desegregation plan.
24
The effects of past discrimination were also felt in the area of
employment. The Fourth Circuit dealt with equal employment op-
the argument that the plaintiff must "attempt" to have an order entered as to whether
the action may be maintained as a class action. No. 71-2175 (4th Cir. July 13, 1973)
at 4 of the slip opinion. In that case, however, the plaintiff had not brought a class
action in the original complaint. The district court found that his subsequent motion
for an order for determination as a class action which was filed 21 months later was
unreasonably delayed. In the instant case the original complaint was framed as a class
action. See also WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 72, at 314 nn.70-72 and accompanying text.
"482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 42 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974).
"'The court found that under the district court plan forty-two percent of the city's
black elementary school children would have attended two schools which were both
approximately ninety percent black. Id. at 1063.
19402 U.S. 1 (1971).
'"0482 F.2d at 1063. See also Note, School District Consolidation: The Constitu-
tional Unit of Equality, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 369 (1973); Note, School Desegrega-
tion and Affirmative Equitable Relief: Swann and Beyond, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
277 (1972).
121482 F.2d at 1064, citing Thompson v. School Bd., 265 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1972)
(emphasis in original).
'2482 F.2d at 1064.
'1402 U.S. 33 (1971).
12482 F.2d at 1065.
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portunity in two suits against railroads arising under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 21 In Rock v. Norfolk and Western Railway,'2 the com-
plaint alleged racial discrimination in employment at the railroad's
two terminal yards in Norfolk, Virginia. Plaintiffs sought a merger of
the seniority rosters at the two yards. The court's decision turned on
the issue of whether the defendant's employment practices were the
result of business necessity, an exception to the Act's mandate of
equal employment. In order to qualify as an exception, an employ-
ment practice must not only foster safety and efficiency, but must
also be essential to that goal.12 The court held that the evidence
failed to show that the separate seniority system was essential to the
safe, efficient operation of the rail yards and ordered the merger of
the seniority lists.
In United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 28 the court again
applied the test of business necessity, but, more significantly,
adopted a relatively new remedy to eliminate the effects of past dis-
criminatory hiring practices. The court found that prior to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 the railroad had discriminated in hiring for its
three classifications of employees, blacks being segregated into the
lowest of the three. Relying on a precedent established by the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits, 2 9 the Fourth Circuit allowed cross-craft relief.
Under this plan, "group three" black employees hired prior to the Act
were allowed to bid for all "group one" jobs for which they could
qualify and at the same time maintain their company seniority accu-
mulated in the lower classification assignment. The court held that
union policies and the current collective bargaining agreements
which prohibited the transfer of seniority were not a bar to the appli-
cation of the Act since the right to equal employment could not be
bargained away.
In another class action brought under the equal employment op-
portunity provisions, Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co.,130 the court or-
dered changes in the defendant's pre-employment testing procedures
'242 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1970).
" 473 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1973).
'1Accord, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116
(1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
1-471 F.2d 582 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973).
"-'United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451
F.2d 418, 458 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
11"474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973).
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and allowed damages in the form of backpay. Citing the Supreme
Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.3 ' as authority, the
Fourth Circuit held that personnel tests must be "job-related, have
a manifest relationship to employment, and have been validated in
accordance with [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]
guidelines."'32 Such validation requires detailed empirical analysis of
the test's asserted job-related nature as opposed to possible subjec-
tive ratings made by supervisors who in this case were only given
vague standards by which to judge job performance. The court also
found that backpay was allowable where a discriminatory seniority
system had perpetrated unequal employment practices even though
there was no evidence of bad faith noncompliance with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.'1
3
Actions were also brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover dam-
ages from state officials for injuries caused by the deprivation of civil
rights. The Fourth Circuit specifically confronted the issue of what
constitutes a defense sufficient to bar liability of state officials under
the statute. In Hill v. Rowland,'34 a suit for damages against a police
officer for false arrest, the court held that the test of liability in a
§ 1983 action is not the objective test of "probable cause" but rather
"the partly subjective test of the reasonable good faith of the police
officers in the legality of the arrest.' '3 5 The court cited two other
federal court decisions in allowing the less stringent standard of the
reasonable man in cases of alleged unlawful arrest and search.
36
D. Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Cases
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for the award of attorney
1401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11"474 F.2d at 139. See Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment
Test Validation: A Uniform Test for Both Public and Private Employers, 41 GEO.
WASHI. L. REV. 505 (1973); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 72 CowNU. L. REv. 900 (1972).
'1474 F.2d at 142. Judge Boreman dissented as to the backpay issue, questioning
whether the mandate to award such damages exists in the Act. Id.
'1474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973).
11Id. at 1377. For a discussion of the good faith defense in other actions against
government officials see Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1973); Eslinger
v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973). Eslinger involved a suit for damages against
the Clerk of the Senate of South Carolina for refusing to hire a female as a senate page.
The court allowed the defense of good faith, but also noted the collateral issue of
governmental immunity. See generally Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity and
Section 1983. A New Look at an Old Problem, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 344 (1973).
''Biven v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972); Richardson
v. Snow, 340 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Md. 1972).
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fees to the prevailing party in certain civil rights actions.3 7 In Lea v.
Cone Mills Corp., a the Fourth Circuit ruled that a motion under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) for the award of attorney fees in employment
discrimination cases was exempt from Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which requires that in actions tried without jury,
the judge must make findings of fact and conclusions of law. A judge's
discretionary award in that case did not therefore constitute error
since the amount awarded was not "clearly wrong."
In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,3 9 the Fourth Circuit
reversed an award of attorney fees in a school desegregation case,
holding that the evidence did not support a finding of "obdurate
obstinacy" on the part of the school board in its failure to develop
an acceptable plan of desegregation. The court found that such an
award was inappropriate where the school board had no clear legal
standards on which to rely in formulating its plan for a unitary school
system.4 The Fourth Circuit also interpreted § 718 of the Federal
Emergency School Act of 1972"' and found it inapplicable where a
final order against the plaintiff had been entered in the case. 4 '
IV. FEDERAL STATUTES AND GOVERNMENTAL
REGULATION
A. Environmental Protection
In several cases involving the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Fourth Circuit construed and applied the Clean Air Act,'43
the National Environmental Policy Act,'44 and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.' 4 The court found in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA'46
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000c-7, 2000e-5(k) (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612,
:3612(c) (1970); Emergency School Aid Act § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1972).
1 467 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1972).
1 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W..3644 (U.S. June 12,
1973).
"1"Id. at 322. See Note, Attorney Fees in School Desegregation Cases, 29 WASH. &
IE ]L. RFEv. 309 (1972).
"'Section 718 of the Emergency School Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1972). This section
specifically authorizes allowances of attorney fees upon entry of a final order against
an educational agency for failure to comply with the provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 or the fourteenth amendment. See also Medley v. School Bd. of Danville, 482
F.2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974)
(Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
11-472 F.2d at 332.
m142 U.S.C. § 1857(c) et seq. (1971).
"'42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq (1970).
"'5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
""477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
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that neither the Clean Air Act nor the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment required the Administrator of EPA to provide
in all instances an evidentiary hearing prior to approval of state plans
for emission control. The court reasoned that where state hearings on
the plans are adequate and are reviewed by the Administrator in the
course of his own evaluation of the state proposals, no additional
procedural safeguard is necessary.
Another procedural issue arose under the National Environmental
Policy Act in Rucker v. Willis,'47 a suit by conservationists to enjoin
construction of a marina. In Rucker, the United States Army Corps
of Engineers had not issued an environmental impact statement prior
to granting the building permit. However, the court held that, under
the Act's guidelines, an impact statement need not be prepared sim-
ply because there is opposition to the proposed use of the environ-
ment. Rather, the requirement to issue an impact statement was held
to apply only "where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature
or effect of the major federal action.""'4 In this instance, the Fourth
Circuit found that the granting of the permit did not constitute a
major federal action' and therefore did not require the issuance of
an environmental impact statement. Furthermore, since the Corps of
Engineers had made a thorough good faith assessment of the environ-
mental effect of the proposed project, the decision to grant the permit
was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.
Release of information gathered by EPA was the object of two
actions brought under the Freedom of Information Act. In Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA,'5 a manufacturer sued under § (b) (5) of the Act 5' to
force disclosure of medical and scientific data which the Administra-
tor had considered in connection with the issuance of proposed lead
content regulations under the Clean Air Act. In rejecting the defen-
dant's theory of "executive privilege," the court held that the consti-
tutional doctrine of executive privilege was no broader than the ex-
"1484 F.2d 158.
"'Id. at 162.
"'The decision contains a list of cases in which major federal action has been
found. Id. at 163.
3-41 U.S.L.W. 2660 (4th Cir. May 10, 1973).
' 'Section 552(b)(5) of the Act reads as follows:
(b) This section shall not apply to matters that are-
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
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emption provided under § (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information Act.
Therefore, since the Administrator had failed to bring himself within
the ambit of the exemption provided for in the Act, he was not pro-
tected against disclosure.
The Administrator was also unsuccessful in resisting a suit to
compel disclosure in Robles v. EPA52 where he based his defense
upon a specific exemption of the Freedom of Information Act. In that
case, the plaintiffs sought the release of information collected by EPA
relating to the existence of radioactivity in homes built on fill dirt
obtained from a uranium processing plant. In rejecting the Adminis-
trator's claim, the court found that the information sought was not
''similar" to "personnel and medical files" which are exempt under
§ (b)(6)113 of the Act because of their highly personal nature.,", The
Fourth Circuit, in ordering disclosure, stated that there was to be no
"balancing of equities or . . .weighing of need or benefit" in deter-
mining whether the right to disclosure would be a "clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.'
'z 5
B. Federal Taxation
The Fourth Circuit also made determinations under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. The court examined the applicability of the reali-
zation and recognition requirements of the Code to claims of tax-
exemption by several taxpayers. It considered the applicability of
the Code's anti-injunction provision to suits brought to enjoin the
termination of tax-exempt status. Finally, the court significantly
contributed to the controversy over the Commissioner's use of the
"John Doe" summons to require production of records prepared and
held by accounting firms.
Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States5 1 presented the question of
whether the replacement of property held for productive use in trade
or business resulted in a sale under § 1002 or a "like kind" exchange
*-484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970) reads in part:
(b) This section shall not apply to...
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclo-
sure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy.
"'The court thoroughly discussed its interpretation, of the quoted terms. 484 F.2d
843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Note, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1972).
1-484 F.2d 843, 848 (4th Cir. 1973).
15480 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1973).
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under § 1031. The case involved the taxpayer's sale of old trucks to
a third party and his purchase of new trucks from a dealer. The
dealer, without the taxpayer's knowledge, had supplied funds to the
third party to buy the old trucks and then subsequently took title to
most of the used trucks from the third party. The existence of both a
contract binding the taxpayer to buy the new trucks, whether or not
he sold the old ones, and legitimate business reasons for effecting the
replacement in two steps convinced the court that the transactions
were complimentary but not mutually dependent. The court held,
therefore, that no "like kind" exchange had occurred and that the
taxpayer's basis for depreciation for the new trucks was properly their
cost computed under § 1012 rather than a substituted basis under
§ 1031(d).'5
In Harris v. Commissioner,'58 the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's determination as to when gain must be recognized in a case
involving the sale of an incompetent's property. Pursuant to North
Carolina law, the state court had approved a plan designed to mini-
mize the tax consequences of the transaction whereby the proceeds
of the sale were to be placed in an escrow account to be disbursed in
installments to the incompetent. The Fourth Circuit noted the gen-
eral rule that the sale proceeds are constructively received "when
available without restriction," notwithstanding the utilization of an
escrow devise solely to defer "actual" receipt. In applying this rule
to the transaction at bar, the court held that the gain was recognized
when the sale proceeds were deposited into the escrow account and
therefore were includable in gross income under § 61(a) as provided
by § 451(a) and Treasury Regulation § 1.451-2(a). Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit found that since the state court was acting on behalf
of the incompetent taxpayer, its order that the money be put in
escrow was "in legal effect" the act of the taxpayer.
In the area of excludable receipts, the Fourth Circuit ruled upon
the taxable status of certain cash awards in Rogallo v. United
States.'59 The court held that a cash "contribution award" made
under § 306 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act' 0 to an
inventor-employee for the contribution of the rights for his invention
to NASA was not excludable from the inventor's gross income. The
award was found to be primarily compensatory rather than gratuitous
and therefore not exempt under § 74(b).
'"For a discussion of the test of separability of transactions, see 3 J. MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDER[AL INCOME TAXATION §§ 20.161, 20.163 (1972).
''477 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1973).
'11475 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973).
'142 U.S.C. § 2458 (1970).
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In a case of apparent first impression under § 531 of the Code, the
Fourth Circuit in Inland Terminals, Inc. v. United States6 , found
that the taxpayer, a wholly-owned subsidiary, was not subject to the
accumulated earnings tax. The court held that, in assessing the rea-
sonable needs of a wholly-owned subsidiary, it is permissible to con-
sider the reasonable business needs of its parent, but only to the
extent that the business needs of the parent have not already been
used to justify the parent's accumulation of earnings. It was noted in
support of this conclusion that Treasury Regulation § 1.537-3(b) does
not forbid one corporation from accumulating earnings for another
where it does not control the other.
In Behrend v. United States,"2 the Fourth Circuit encountered a
strong Government argument to reconstruct a series of events
through use of the step transaction doctrine. The court held that the
taxpayers, who had donated preferred stock in their controlled corpo-
ration to their family-owned charitable foundation, did not realize
constructive dividend income when the corporation subsequently
redeemed the stock from the foundation. Although the redemption
had been planned from the beginning of the entire transaction, the
court did not consider this fact as controlling in the absence of a
"binding obligation" requiring the redemption. 3 The court also
noted that the taxpayers' control of both the corporation and founda-
tion would not result in their constructive receipt of income where
they "did not participate whatsoever in the beneficence of the foun-
dation."'64
In Old Dominion Box Co. v. United States,' the Court of Appeals
held that tax-exempt status can be revoked where a foundation is
engaged in noncharitable activities. In this case the foundation had
engaged in inflating the value of debentures it had received from a
director of the company and lost its tax-exempt status under § 501
of the Code. The Fourth Circuit did not accept the corporate tax-
payer's argument that the revocation of tax-exempt status should not
affect the deductible nature of the corporation's gifts to the founda-
tion. Rather, it held that the evidence of overlapping management of
"'477 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1973).
11273-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,065 (4th Cir. 1972). For an in-depth discussion of this case
see Note, The Donation-Redemption of Closely Held Stock as a Constructive Dividend
to the Donor, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 129 (1974) (this issue).
"-Id. at 80,067.
"Id.
11,477 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
the foundation and the taxpayer was sufficient to support the finding
that the latter was not an innocent contributor.
Bob Jones University v. Connolly'" was an action by the univer-
sity to enjoin the threatened revocation of its tax-exempt status. In
reversing the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, the
Fourth Circuit held that the suit constituted an action to enjoin the
assessment of taxes and was thus barred by § 7421, the tax anti-
injunction statute.6 ' The court found this statute permits such suits
only when there is a showing that (1) irreparable injury will result if
collection is effected and (2) "under no circumstances [will] the
government ultimately prevail" in its assertion of tax liability.'6 8 It
was the court's opinion that these conditions were absent in the pres-
ent case.
The enforcement of "John Doe" summonses by the Internal Reve-
nue Service was at issue in United States v. Theodore.'5 Although the
court did not reach the fourth amendment objection relating to un-
reasonable searches, it did set out standards for the enforcement of
such summonses. The case originated in a proceeding by the Internal
Revenue Service to enforce an administrative summons issued under
§ 7602 directing the executive of an accounting firm to produce all
records pertaining to the preparation of unidentified clients' income
tax returns for a three-year period. The district court ordered the
executive to produce the documents, but the Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded, finding that § 7602 does "not authorize the use of
open-ended John Doe summonses."' 70 Rather, the court held that this
section only allows the "IRS to summon information relating to the
correctness of a particular return or a particular person,'" 7 without
elaborating upon the meaning of either the term "particular" or
'1472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973). Judge Boreman dissented.
" 'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421 provides in part:
(a) Tax.-Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a),
and 7426(a) and (b)(1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court
by any person....
But see "Americans United", Inc. v. Walter, 41 U.S.L.W. 2392 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11,
1973). For a discussion of the distinctions between this and the principal case, see
Comment, Avoiding the Anti-Injunction Statute in Suits to Enjoin Termination of
Tax-Exempt Status, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1014 (1973).
'"'472 F.2d at 906, citing Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
'1479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973). For an in-depth discussion of this case see Note,
The Standards for Enforceability of John Doe Summonses of Third Party Records
Relating to the Affairs of Unidentified Taxpayers, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 162 (1974)
(this issue).
'7"479 F.2d at 755.
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"open-ended." The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that
the IRS had the power to summon a list of names, addresses, and
social security numbers of the clients if, on remand, it was estab-
lished that such information was not reasonably accessible to the IRS
from its own files.
C. Securities Regulation
The court dealt with alleged violations of the registration and
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 193372 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934'1 in SEC v. Daltronics Engineers, Inc.' The
Securities and Exchange Commission charged that the defendant
corporation was involved in a scheme of mergers and spin-offs
whereby it was making a distribution of unregistered shares of stock
to its shareholders.' The court defined "sale" as a "disposition of a
security" in return "for value."' 76 In holding that the spin-offs consti-
tuted the sale of unregistered securities in violation of § 5 of the 1933
Act, it ruled that Daltronics had received "value" because the inter-
est it had retained in the merged companies was enhanced when the
spun-off stock began to be traded. 77 Alternatively, the defendant was
found to be an underwriter within the meaning of the 1933 Act and
therefore subject to its registration requirements. The court also held
that the defendant had made misleading statements regarding the
spin-offs to its stockholders in violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder.
D. Federal Labor Law
1. National Labor Relations Act
The Fourth Circuit reviewed several particularly noteworthy find-
ings of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) involving the
Board procedure of consolidating for a single hearing objections to a
'
7 1
1d.
1'-15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
1'315 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
17'No. 72-2240 (4th Cir., July 27, 1973).
'17See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(2)(D) and (E).
"'No. 72-2240 (4th Cir., July 27, 1973) at 6.
1'The pattern of the spin-offs was as follows: Daltronics would enter into an
agreement with a private company whereby the latter would merge into a Daltronic
subsidiary or a new corporation created by Daltronic. The principals of the private
company would receive the majority interest in the merger corporation with Daltronics
retaining the remainder and disbursing it to its shareholders. Id. at 4-5.
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representative election and charges of unfair labor practices. The
court also considered several claims of coercion under § 8(a) (1) of the
National Labor Relations Act' 5 (NLRA).
The long-established NLRB procedure of consolidating for a sin-
gle hearing objections to a representative election and charges of
unfair labor practices was challenged in a Fourth Circuit case Barrus
Construction Co. v. NLRB."I Such consolidations have been chal-
lenged on the grounds that an attorney simultaneously representing
the Board in a representation case and the General Counsel in an
unfair labor practice case results in a conflict of interest establishing
a denial of due process. The majority of the court, despite a lengthy
dissent, expressed its approval of the consolidation procedure.'8
In the Fourth Circuit decision NLRB v. Quality Manufacturing
Co.,'"' the issue was raised whether §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
guarantee an employee's right to union representation at a pre-
disciplinary interview with an employer.'82 Traditionally, it has been
a violation of § 7'1 and § 8(a)(1)"" of the NLRA for an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee when the employee is
participating in protected union activities. Accordingly, after disci-
plinary action has been taken by an employer, and a grievance has
been filed by the union, an employee has had the right to union
representation at a confrontation with his employer.'815 Over a sixteen
'1'29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
'79483 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1973).
'"Id. at 193.
'481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 1021.
'ONational Labor Relations Act § 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization; to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
'National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7; ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
17exaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1969). In this case the Fifth
Circuit stated:
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year period decisions of two circuits'86 and the NLRB'5 7 have held that
the right to union representation does not arise until after discipline
has been taken by the employer. However, in Quality Manufacturing
the Board attempted to distinguish this line of cases by stating that
when the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that discipli-
nary action will be taken, he has the right to be represented by the
union. The Fourth Circuit disagreed and denied enforcement of the
Board's order, noting that the present case was indistinguishable
from the precedent and that the employee had an opportunity for
redress in the formal grievance procedures.'18
In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 88 the Fourth Circuit
found that an NLRB order involving coercive threats and roll-back
rights'" was supported by substantial evidence and should be en-
forced. The Board had found that: (1) a meeting called by a plant
manager during which the plant employees were told that they would
lose their company benefits if a union were elected to represent them,
constituted a coercive threat and was a violation of § 8(a)(1) of the
Section 7 of the Act [NLRA] invests employees with the right
to bargain collectively through their chosen representatives. Sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) provide that an employer's refusal to respect this
right constitutes an unfair labor practice. "Collective bargaining" is
defined by section 8(d) as "the performance of the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
Id. at 144 (emphasis in original).
'"Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Ross Gear and
Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947).
"17E.g., Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964).
'The Seventh Circuit reached the same decision on the same NLRB distinction
in Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
1480 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1973).
"'The court offered the following explanation of the roll-back procedure:
The employees would acquire plantwide seniority from the time they
were hired and work group seniority from the time they were placed
in a certain work group. By using both types of seniority, an employee
could advance not only within his own work group but could bid for
transfers to other work groups within the plant. In the event of a layoff
within a work group, an employee's work group seniority controlled
who left the group. Although the employee may have lacked sufficient
seniority to retain employment in his work group, he was permitted
to "bump back" or "roll back" to the plantwide labor pool, and by
exercising his plantwide seniority, he could displace employees within
the pool having less plantwide seniority.
Id. at 1246-47.
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NLRA;I" and (2) that the cancellation of a single employee's roll-
back rights, and the subsequent termination of his employment con-
stituted a violation of § 8(a)(3)'9 2 of the Act.'93 In support of its ap-
proval of the Board's conclusions, the Fourth Circuit held that the
cancellation of roll-back rights and termination of employment ful-
filled the three requirements for a violation of § 8(a)(3):
(1) employer discrimination as to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment; (2) a resulting encour-
agement or discouragement of membership in a union; and (3)
anti-union motive.'
9
4
In Robertshaw Controls Co. v. NLRB,'9 5 the Fourth Circuit
granted partial enforcement of a Board order which found that oral
reprimands given to pro-union employees were motivated by anti-
union considerations rather than a fear of violence. The court ac-
cepted the Board's finding that the pro-union employees in their
organizational efforts had not harassed other employees despite
claims to the contrary. However, because there was no indication of
coercion by the employer, the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce that
portion of the order which found the employer's request for certain
of his employees' prehearing statements violative of § 8(a)(1).196 The
prehearing statements had been made to the NLRB by five employ-
ees whose charges of harassment by pro-union employees had initi-
ated the employer's original reprimand procedure. The statements
were valuable to the employer in the preparation of a defense to the
charge that the reprimands violated the NLRA. The Board, in finding
the employer guilty of a § 8(a)(1) violation, had cited several cases
supporting the position that a request for an employee's prehearing
1'Id. at 1247.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3) provides:
It shall be an unfair practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization: ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
"'480 F.2d at 1248.
191d., citing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1967).
1 483 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1973).
"National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1) states, in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in ... this section; ....
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
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statement constituted coercion per se. 197 However, the Fourth Circuit
distinguished these decisions' g and held that since the company had
made clear in its request that compliance or noncompliance would
neither be rewarded nor punished, the request was not an unlawful
interference with the employee's right to organize. The court denied
enforcement of the Board's order despite contentions that the em-
ployees' willingness to provide information would be inhibited and
the Board's ability to investigate allegations of unfair labor practices
would be impaired.' 9
2. Fair Labor Standards Act
In Hodgson v. Elk Garden Corp.,°0 the Fourth Circuit established
a new standard for determining whether an employer of agricultural
labor should be exempted from the minimum wage and recording
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act"' on the ground that
his employees are "principally engaged in range production of live-
stock."' 2 In most instances, the exemption is allowed only when "the
employees must constantly attend, on a standby basis, livestock that
is on a range away from the ranch's headquarters. '20 3 The court con-
cluded that the fact that the animals are grazed on the range is not
in and of itself controlling. Additionally, the court stated that "when
Congress used the phrase 'range production of livestock,' it intended
to describe a method of raising cattle or sheep in which the computa-
tion of the hours worked by employees caring for the stock would be
extremely difficult. ' ' 214 As a result of this clear legislative intent, the
Fourth Circuit held that the exemption should require an examina-
tion of the terrain on which the cattle are raised "only for determining
whether its characteristics require employees to work in such a man-
ner that computation of their hours is difficult.12 5
'7NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2nd Cir. 1971); Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Ambox, Inc., 357 F.2d 138
(5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); Texas
Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964); Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB,
328 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1964).
1"483 F.2d at 767-69.
'1Jd. at 769.
-"482 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1973).
129 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1970).
-The exemption is set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(b)(E) (1970).
- Id. at 534-35.
-'d. at 533.
-5Id.
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V. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Pre-Trial
1. Miranda Warnings
A conflict exists among the circuits as to the proper interpretation
of the constitutional requirements mandated by Miranda v.
Arizona.2 16 In Wright v. North Carolina,2 7 the Fourth Circuit upheld
a warning which stated that if the person in custody desires a lawyer
one would be appointed "if and when [he goes] to court. 2 8 In reject-
ing the "instant counsel" theory, which requires a statement that one
has the right of counsel immediately and not at some later time, the
Fourth Circuit adopted the view of the Fifth Circuit as expressed in
United States v. Lacy.211 In Lacy the Fifth Circuit held that Miranda
demands only that one in custody be informed that he has the right
to defer answering any questions until the time an attorney is ap-
-'384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-7483 F.2d 405 (4th Cir. 1973).
"1Id. at 409-10. The full Miranda warning given to the defendant is set forth below:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice
before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during
questioning. You have this right to advice and presence of a lawyer
even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a
lawyer, but one will be appointed for you if you wish, if and when you
go to Court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer
present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time.
You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk
to a lawyer.
Id. at 410 (appendix).
2446 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1971). The following language of the Lacy court is similar
to the position adopted by the Fourth Circuit:
We think this warning comports with the requirements of Miranda.
Lacy was informed that he had the right to the presence of an ap-
pointed attorney before any questioning. The agents did say that the
appointment of an attorney would have to be made by the court at a
later date. But they also made perfectly clear that Lacy had a right
not to answer questions until that time should come. Thus we think
the twin requirements of Lathers v. United States, 5 Cir. 1968, 396
F.2d 524 were met: the defendant was informed that (a) he had the
right to the presence of an attorney and (b) that the right was to have
an attorney "before he uttered a syllable." That the attorney was not
to be appointed until later seems immaterial since Lacy was informed
that he had the right to put off answering any questions until the time
when he did have an appointed attorney.
Id. at 513, See also Mayzak v. United States, 402 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1968).
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pointed for him. By following Lacy the Fourth Circuit adopted an
interpretation of Miranda which is consistent with a prior decision by
the Second Circuit,2" but inconsistent with decisions in both the
Seventh1 ' and Ninth"2 Circuits.
2. Right to Counsel and Hearing
The Fourth Circuit has traditionally followed the rule that late
appointment of counsel "is inherently prejudicial, and . . .consti-
tutes a prima facie case of denial of effective assistance of counsel,
so that the burden of proving lack of prejudice is shifted to the
state.'21' However, in Garland v. Cox,"' the court was forced to recon-
sider its rule in light of a recent Supreme Court case" ' and recent
decisions rendered by other federal courts of appeal." ' In Garland,
the court reviewed these later decisions and, although retaining its
rule, held that where a petitioner demonstrates late appointment of
counsel, a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel will oper-
ate in the absence of contradictory evidence. However, the moment
contravening evidence is presented from any source, the presumption
vanishes completely as though it never existed."' Thus, the court
reaffirmed its position that the burden of proving that the defendant
was not prejudiced by late appointment of counsel lies with the state
yet significantly altered the effect of this rule in its modification of
the presumption. Although the Fourth Circuit recognized the conflict
between its own rule and those adopted by the First and Third Cir-
cuits which incorporate a presumption running in favor of the state, 28
""Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1117 (1973).
"'United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971).
"'United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970).21Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1967), (emphasis in original) citing,
Twilford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1967).
214472 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1973).
2"Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
" Restrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir. 1971); Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
2 1This is the Thayer, or "bursting bubble," theory under which the only effect of
a presumption is to shift the burden of producing evidence with regard to the presumed
fact. If the evidence is produced by the adversary, the presumption is spent and
disappears. In the words of McCormick: "[i]n practical terms, the theory means that,
although a presumption is available to permit the party relying upon it to survive a
motion for directed verdict at the close of his own case, it has no other value in the
trial." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 345, at 821 (2d ed. 1972). This view is sanctioned
by Wigmore, 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491(2) (3d ed. 1940), and adopted in the
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704(2) (1942). See also Laughlin, In Support of the
Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195 (1953).
21'Restrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir. 1971); Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
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the Fourth Circuit stated:
The value of our own rule is in those relatively rare situations
where because of passage of time or the unavailability of mate-
rial witnesses, a defendant can show late appointment and no
more. In such cases, it comports with notions of fair play to
expect the state, with its greater resources, to bear the burden
of demonstrating regularity, especially since a court of the
state, not the defendant, produced the unhappy situation by
originally making the late appointment."'
The court also considered the relationship of due process to the
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. In a 1970 decision, Kemplen v.
Maryland ,220 the court considered a Maryland statute which permit-
ted a juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and thus permit a juve-
nile to be tried and sentenced as an adult. The court held that a
juvenile was entitled to counsel at a waiver hearing and that the
juvenile, his parents, and counsel must be given adequate notice of
the nature, date, and charges to be considered at the proceeding so
that they might have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present
the juvenile's position on the waiver question.2 2 ' The Fourth Circuit
recently enlarged upon the scope of Kemplen in the case of Cox v.
United States.
22
In Cox, the defendant and four companions held up a North Caro-
lina bank and all five were apprehended. Cox was seventeen years of
age at the time of the offense. The request by the United States
Attorney to try Cox as an adult offender was approved by the Depart-
ment of Justice. When the United States Attorney obtained this au-
thorization, Cox was neither represented by counsel, nor was he given
notice that the request had been made or granted. Furthermore, he
was given no opportunity to controvert the data considered by the
Department of Justice or to advance other information which might
have supported the case for juvenile proceedings. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the decision that a juvenile be dealt with as an adult
offender is a "critical stage" in the criminal proceedings and, there-
fore, the right to counsel fully attaches. The court also held that Cox,
his parents, and counsel should have been notified of the United
States Attorney's request and should have been given an opportunity
to present Cox's opposing arguments. The dissent criticized the ma-
219472 F.2d at 879.
-0428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).
22Id. at 175.
222473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973). For discussion of this case see Note, Due Process
and Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 30 WASH. & LzE L. Rav. 591 (1973).
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jority's application of the Kemplen rationale to Cox:
Actually .... that decision [Kemplen] does not touch the
instant case; rather its determinant completely divorces it
from consideration here. There, appellant was already before
the court, and the court, not the prosecutor, was called upon
to decide the most appropriate forum for the trial. The ques-
tion was purely judicial and counsel was required to develop
defendant's most advantageous course.
Just the opposite obtained here. Unlike Kemplen, the ac-
cused was not before the court. No court was making a decision
as to his welfare. Appellant complains rather of an act of the
Attorney General-a step both inherently within the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive branch of Government and explic-
itly authorized by Congress.
22 3
3. Eyewitness Identification
In a relatively unsettled area of the law, the Fourth Circuit ruled
in Smith v. Coiner22 that a "one-to-one" confrontation was so unnec-
essarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identifica-
tion that admitting evidence of the identification as part of the gov-
ernment's direct case denied the defendant due process. In determin-
ing that the confrontation denied the defendant due process, the
court employed the "totality of the circumstances" test announced
by the Supreme Court in Stovall v. Denno.25 The defendant, after
being booked on a rape charge, was taken in handcuffs to the doctor's
office where the elderly victim was being treated. The defendant,
with a state policeman on each arm, was exhibited to the victim who
promptly identified him as the man who had attacked her five hours
earlier. This "positive" identification was made despite the fact that
at the time of the assault the victim was not wearing her glasses, had
cataracts, and caught only a brief glimpse of her assailant through
the use of a flashlight. Additionally, prior to the one-to-one confron-
tation, the victim described her assailant as resembling a man nearly
twice as old as the defendant. The Fourth Circuit apparently relied
upon the victim's visual difficulties and inconsistent statements in
ruling the prejudicial confrontation as being particularly responsible
for the identification.
'1473 F.2d at 344-45 (emphasis in original).
-'473 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973).
- 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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4. Wharton Rule
The Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Bobo226 that the
Wharton Rule was not applicable to an indictment charging a con-
spiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1955 which makes it a violation to
conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of an
illegal gambling business.22 In essence, the Wharton Rule states:
[Wihen by definition the intended substantive offense re-
quires a plurality of actors, a conspiracy prosecution cannot be
maintained if only the minimum number of parties logically
necessary for the commission of the substantive offense agree
to commit it.22
The appellants argued that the indictment charged a conspiracy to
commit a crime one element of which was conspiracy.
The Wharton Rule is a concept that has been given a wide range
of interpretation. Among the cases that have considered the issue, the
only apparent point of agreement is the validity of the rule as applied
to the crimes listed by Wharton when the rule was announced: duel-
ing, bigamy, incest and adultery. The Fourth Circuit limited the
scope of the Wharton Rule in two earlier decisions,29 and in Bobo
further defined its interpretation of the rule:
We are of the opinion that the following elements must
coexist or else the rule may not apply: the immediate effect of
the act in view, which is the gist of the substantive offense,
reaches only the participants therein; the agreement of the
paritcipants is necessary for the completion of the substantive
offense; and the conspiracy must be in such close connection
with the substantive offense as to be inseparable from it.2°
Recent decisions of other federal courts both agree2' and disagree 
2
-477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973).
1Id. at 987.
2 aNote, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920,
954 (1959). There is no definitive statement of the rule.
-Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945); Lisansky v.
United States, 31 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929).
2477 F.2d at 987. For discussion of Bobo case and the Wharton Rule see Note,
Wharton's Rule and Conspiracy to Operate an Illegal Gambling Business, 30 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 613 (1973).
"'United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Benter,
457 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
"2United States v. Figueredo, 350 F. Supp. 1031 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States
v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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with the Fourth Circuit's analysis.
5. Appointment of Psychiatrist
In United States v. Matthews,3 3 the court advised district judges
that the appointment of a psychiatrist pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006AI:3 should be made with the advice and approval of counsel
for the defendant, and, "[u]nless some reason affirmatively ap-
pears," the court should select the psychiatrist preferred by the de-
fendant.135 The Fourth Circuit stated that ordinarily this practice
should be followed, although it is not mandatory. The Court of Ap-
peals further stated that the district court should also require the
defendant to submit to examination by a government psychiatrist
whenever a psychiatrist of the defendant's choice is appointed. Fur-
thermore, the court ruled that when a district court judge finds it
necessary to participate in the psychiatrist selection process, he
should ordinarily require the defendant to nominate two or more
physicians from whom the judge may then select one. 236 With regard
to medical witnesses in general, the Fourth Circuit stated:
Nothing we have said is meant to foreclose the possibility,
too rarely implemented, of the government and the defendant
agreeing on one medical witness. Indeed, the avoidance of mul-
tiple expert witnesses is a preferred solution but one that can
be achieved only by genuine consent.1
3
1
B. Trial
1. Guilty Pleas
The Fourth Circuit held in Wade v. Coiner238 that "[ais a matter
of expediency and circumspection," state judges may choose to en-
gage in the colloquy mandated for federal judges by Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but they are not constitution-
-472 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1973).
L'18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e)(1) (1970) provides:
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative,
expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense may re-
quest them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate
inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and
that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court, or the
United States magistrate if the services are required in connection
with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel
to obtain the services.
11147 2 F.2d at 1174.
2"Id. at 1174-75.
"'Id. at 1175.
-468 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1972).
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ally required to do so.29 The court ruled that it is enough if the record
affirmatively shows that a plea was voluntarily and intelligently en-
tered. The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that due process does
not require that a defendant be given a specific monition as to each
constitutional right waived by entry of the plea. 20 The Fourth Circuit
also suggested that in a state criminal proceeding it would probably
be constitutionally sufficient for the clerk of court, defendant's coun-
sel, or the solicitor to advise the state defendant of the charge and
consequences of his plea in lieu of the judge so informing the defen-
dant as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.
21'
Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution24 2 presented a question
concerning the validity of a guilty plea. The court held that the
petitioner's plea of guilty to a criminal assault in a Maryland state
court was voluntary although he had not been informed that the
court's acceptance of his plea would subject him to possible commit-
ment to a therapeutic institution pursuant to the Maryland Defective
Delinquent Act.22 The court based its decision on two factors: (1)
commitment to the institution did not automatically result from his
plea, but rather was determined in an independent civil proceeding;
m211d. at 1060. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of
the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to
plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Supreme Court stated:
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment
demands the utmost solicitude of which the courts are capable in
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.
Id. at 243-44.
20468 F.2d at 1061, citing United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971).
21468 F.2d at 1060.
242475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973). For an in-depth discussion of this case see Note,
The Rational Basis for Guilty Pleas and the Restrictive Scope of Direct Consequences,
31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 236 (1974) (this issue).
2rMD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 1 et seq. (Repl. vol. 1971). For a detailed statement
of the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act, see Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153,
1155-56, (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, Murel v. Baltimore Criminal Court, 407 U.S.
355 (1972).
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and (2) commitment to the institution was not imposed in the nature
of punishment, but represented an "enlightened and progressive ex-
periment" aimed at rehabilitating persons whose anti-social activi-
ties are caused by mental disorders.
In Parker v. Ross, 244 the Fourth Circuit ruled that "an indictment
by an unlawfully composed grand jury does not invalidate a subse-
quent voluntary and intelligent guilty plea, entered upon the advice
of competent counsel and with awareness of the nature of the charge
and the probable direct consequences of the plea." 5 Parker argued
that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,
20
his guilty plea did not constitute a valid waiver of his right to chal-
lenge the grand jury because the guilty plea did not amount to "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege. '24 7 However, the Fourth Circuit expressed the view that one who
has intelligently pleaded guilty with advice of counsel should not be
allowed belatedly to assert a constitutional deprivation that did not
cause or even trigger the guilty plea. Consequently, it found that the
Johnson test should not be controlling. The court stated that Parker's
conduct either constituted waiver or its "effective equivalent."
2. Admissibility of Evidence
To minimize prejudice and insure a fair trial, the general rule on
the admissibility of evidence states that evidence of previous criminal
activity is not admissible to prove that an accused is a person of bad
character and therefore likely to have committed the crime in ques-
tion. 20 However, if such evidence is offered to prove some proposition
other than bad character, and its probative value outweighs its preju-
dicial effect, the evidence may be admitted. In United States v.
Woods,'2 4' the Fourth Circuit affirmed the propriety of the admission
of evidence of prior crimes in an infanticide case in which the prose-
cutor offered evidence linking the defendant with several prior in-
stances of child abuse. Although the court found authority for its
ruling in recent decisions2 0 and scholarly treatises,25" ' it took a novel
24470 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1972).
24 Id. at 1095.
211304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21 1d. at 464.
248E.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); United States v.
Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); United States
v. Mastrototaro, 455 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1972). See also 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 192
(3d ed. 1940).
11484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973). For an in-depth discussion of this case see Note,
Admissibility of Prior-Crimes Evidence in Prosecutions for Child Abuse, 31 WASH. &
LEE L. RFv. 207 (1974) (this issue).
2"United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Hallman,
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approach in assessing the conclusiveness of the evidence regarding
the defendant's previous history of child abuse. Rather than consider-
ing each prior offense separately, the court considered the evidence
of prior offenses collectively. By viewing the evidence in this manner,
the court discerned a past pattern of child abuse. The court held that
when the crime of infanticide or child abuse is charged, repeated
incidents of previous abuses are "especially relevant because it may
be the only evidence to prove the crime. ' 252 Consequently, admission
of the evidence was permitted as an exception to the general rule.
3. Right to Cross-Examination
In United States v. Jordan,23 the Fourth Circuit held that when
a defendant has an undiminished right to cross-examination, failure
of the trial judge to allow discovery of the names of two eyewitnesses
to a knife attack, and his refusal to grant a continuance for the pur-
pose of investigating these witnesses did not constitute error.254 The
court noted that the government had advised the defense counsel of
the substance of the eyewitnesses' testimony and of the fact that they
were convicted felons. 5  Furthermore, the victim's testimony which
positively identified the defendant as his assailant was in itself
enough to sustain conviction.25 Consequently, the court held that the
government properly refused to disclose the names of these witnesses
439 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Dirring v. United States, 328 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). The Fourth Circuit in interpreting these cases stated:
These cases stand for the proposition that evidence of other offenses
may be received, if relevant, for any purpose other than to show a mere
propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the
crime, provided that the trial judge may exclude the evidence if its
probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will create
a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the accused.
484 F.2d at 134.
"'McCormick states:
[Slome of the wiser opinions (especially recent ones) recognize that
the problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but one of balancing,
on the one side, the actual need of the other-crimes evidence in the
light of the issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution,
the convincingness of the evidence that the other crimes were commit-
ted and that the accused was the actor, and the strength or weakness
of the other-crimes evidence in supporting the issue, and on the other,
the degree to which the jury will probably be roused by the evidence
to overmastering hostility.
C. McCoRMICK, EvIDENCE § 190, at 453 (2d ed. 1972).
25484 F.2d at 133.
2466 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1972).
2 11d. at 101.
111d. at 102.
=Id.
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and that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in refusing to
grant a continuance.
257
4. Prosecutorial Comments
In United States v. Williams, 51 the Fourth Circuit repeated an
earlier admonition regarding prosecutorial comments rendered by
United States Attorneys.219 In a closing argument to the jury, an
Assistant United States Attorney stated that the government's evi-
dence was the only evidence in the case and that it was "uncontrad-
icted and undenied and unrefuted." 66 The court conceded that the
overwhelming weight of authority, even after the Supreme Court's
decision in Griffin v. California,26" ' seems to allow the prosecutor to
point out that the defense did not offer evidence to refute the govern-
ment's case, 262 at least where it is apparent that witnesses other than
the defendant were available to the defense. 63 Accordingly, several
circuits have adopted the following test: "Was the language used
manifestly intended to be, or was it of such character that the jury
would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure
of the accused to testify?" '64 The Fourth Circuit held that the com-
ments to the jury made by the United States Attorney in Williams
appeared to "skirt the precipice of reversible error," 25 and that a not-
guilty plea was an effective denial of all of the government's evidence.
Furthermore, the court stated that from the context in which the
words "uncontradicted" and "unrefuted" were used, it could not "say
with any degree of assurance that the jury was misled.""26
The court had earlier faced the same problem in a 1968 decision.
26 7
There it held that a single statement by the prosecutor, in a closing
argument to the jury, to the effect that certain evidence and testi-
mony was "uncontradicted and undisputed" was not plain error.
However, the court admonished the United States Attorneys within
the Fourth Circuit to observe the spirit of Griffin and to avoid jeop-
ardizing otherwise certain convictions by arguments that border on
2"Id. at 103.
-"479 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1973).
259See United States v. Weems, 398 F.2d 274, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1968).
2479 F.2d at 1140.
2-1380 U.S. 609 (1965).
2"E.g., United States v. Lipton, 467 F.2d 1161, 1168 (2d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Hager, 461 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1972).
6 Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225 (lst Cir. 1965).
26 United States v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1266, 1269 (2d Cir. 1969). See cases cited
therein.
21479 F.2d at 1141.
2"Id.
67United States v. Weems, 398 F.2d 274, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1968).
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forbidden grounds. The court repeated this admonition in United
States v. Williams.
5. "Allen Charge"
Despite strong disagreement among the circuits, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Davis25 reaffirmed its approval of the "Allen
Charge." The Allen Charge is an instruction given to a jury, after the
main charge has been delivered, when the jury returns to the court
for clarification or for further instructions. The name is derived from
the Supreme Court decision, Allen v. United States,"9 in which the
Court upheld a trial judge's instructions that admonished the jurors
to seek agreement among themselves in order to avoid impasse. In
some circuits the Allen Charge has been declared an undue intrusion
into the exclusive province of the jury which constitutes reversible
error . 0 This intrusion is particularly evident when coercion is in-
volved.27" ' Yet the Fourth Circuit has steadfastly maintained the posi-
tion supporting the propriety of the charge. In Davis, the court also
reiterated an earlier recommendation 2 that trial judges in the Cir-
cuit should consider using the American Bar Association version of
the Charge .
3
-481 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1973).
211164 U.S. 492 (1896). In Allen, the following charge was upheld:
These instructions were. . . in substance, that in a large proportion
of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that although the
verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine
the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and
deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide
the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen,
with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if
much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should
consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no im-
pression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally
intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might
not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not
concurred in by the majority.
Id. at 501.
'"United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
"'See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 415 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1969); Sullivan v.
United States, 414 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1969); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1962).
2"2United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970).
273481 F.2d at 429. The American Bar Association recommended charge states as
follows:
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an
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C. Sentencing
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In Hart v. Coiner,274 a habeas corpus action, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed a state court decision which imposed a mandatory life sent-
ence pursuant to the West Virginia recidivist statute.25 The life sent-
ence rested upon three prior convictions: (1) writing a $50 check on
insufficient funds; (2) transporting forged checks in the amount of
$140 across state lines; and (3) perjury.276 The court held that the
"statute's mandatory life sentence is so disproportionate to the seri-
ousness of the underlying offenses, and so grossly excessive that it
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the eighth
amendment.2 7 7 The Fourth Circuit did not invalidate the statute,
but the court did find that the mandatory life sentence was unneces-
sary to accomplish the legislative purpose of the statute on the facts
presented. As stated in the dissent, this decision appears to create a
serious dilemma for the state court judge.2 78 The dissent believed the
instruction which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and
to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can
be done without violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with
his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion
if convinced it is erroneous;
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as
to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of re-
turning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree,
the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may
give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court
shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an
unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE-STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(a) (approved 1968).
27483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973). For an in-depth discussion of this case see Note,
Hart v. Coiner: Mandatory Life Sentence Pursuant to West Virginia Recividist Statute
Held Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1974) (this issue).
2"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966).
7483 F.2d at 138.
2Id.
"'Id. at 145. (Boreman, J., dissenting).
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decision did not fix a formula or standard which would serve as a
guide to aid in the determination of when and under what circum-
stances the mandatory life sentence would be excessive.
2. Furman v. Georgia and Criminal Statutes that Provide for a
Mandatory Death Sentence
United States v. Watson 5 concerned the effect of the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia28 0
upon other federal statutes that provide special assistance to persons
charged with "capital crimes." 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1970) states:
Whoever is indicted for [a] . . .capital crime shall be allowed
to make his full defense by counsel learned in the law; and the
court before which he is tried. . . shall immediately, upon his
request assign to him such counsel, not exceeding two, as he
may desire...2'
The court held that Furman v. Georgia did not effect a judicial repeal
of this statute.2 82 The Fourth Circuit recognized the problem created
by Furman with regard to statutes similar to 18 U.S.C. § 3005.-3
With little success, the court looked to the legislative history of
§ 3005 in order to discern the Congressional purpose behind its enact-
ment. The court concluded, however, that the possibility of the impo-
sition of the death penalty was not the only reason why Congress gave
an accused the right to two attorneys in § 3005.284 The court ex-
pressed the view that any repeal of the statutes affected by Furman
should be carried out by the legislative branch of government and not
the judiciary.8 5 A strong dissent was based upon the proposition that
"the sole reason Congress gave an accused charged with a capital
crime the right to two attorneys was the possibility of imposition of
2sNo. 72-1452 (4th Cir., Aug. 20, 1973).
=408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2'18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1970).
'1No. 72-1452 (4th Cir., Aug. 20, 1973) at 8.
2Furman held that, with respect to two Georgia cases and one Texas case, "the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 408
U.S. at 239-40. Since the penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 under which the
defendant was charged is indistinguishable from those challenged in Furman [death],
the court concluded that had the penalty been imposed on defendant, such a sentence
would have been void. No. 72-1452 (4th Cir., Aug. 20, 1973) at 4. From this set of
circumstances, it may be argued that the defendant was not charged with a "capital
crime" at the time his attorney requested additional counsel and, therefore, that 18
U.S.C. § 3005 should not apply.
2"No. 72-1452 (4th Cir., Aug. 20, 1973) at 11.
2Id. at 12.
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the death penalty. 586 The dissenting judge expressed the view that
any problems created by the Furman decision in the administration
of criminal proceedings could be solved on a case by case basis in the
absence of congressional action.
2
1
7
VI. PERSONAL INJURY
The Fourth Circuit rendered decisions of particular significance
in the area of personal injury involving consumer protection, the
defense of qualified privilege to a charge of libel, the Federal Torts
Claims Act, 2"8 and the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act. 
2 8
A. Consumer Protection
In Matthews v. Ford Motor Co.,285 a statutory provision relating
to unconscionability was determinative in a damage suit brought by
an automobile purchaser against both the manufacturer and the
dealer for injuries sustained in an accident caused by an automobile's
mechanical defect. The manufacturer's express warranty contained
a clause restricting the customer's remedies to replacement of defec-
tive parts. The Fourth Circuit applied § 2-719(3) of the Virginia
Commercial Code and held that the clause in attempting to eliminate
liability for personal injury was prima facie unconscionable, 2 ' and
that the manufacturer had failed to rebut this presumption. Further-
more, the court found that the independent dealer could not rely on
the manufacturer's express disclaimer of implied warranties to avoid
liability on his own implied warranty of fitness since express warran-
ties and disclaimers do not generally run with personal property.
2 2
The Fourth Circuit dealt with the evolving concepts of products
liability in Spangler v. Kranco, Inc.32 A manufacturer had built a
pendant overhead crane in accordance with customer specifications
which did not require that the crane be equipped with a motion-
activated warning device. An employee of the customer's subcontrac-
2 Id. at 16. (Murray, J., dissenting).
21Id. at 18. (Murray, J., dissenting).
2"28 U.S.C 2671 et seq. (1970).
"'CODE W. VA., 23-2-1 (1973).
29(479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973).
2"VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-719(3) (1965) provides in part:
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable ....
"1479 F.2d at 403.
293481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tor was struck and injured by the crane. He claimed that failure to
equip the crane with a warning device caused the crane to be inher-
ently dengerous. The Fourth Circuit held that the manufacturer of
the crane could not be held liable where the crane was without latent
defects and had been built according to customer specifications.
2
11
B. Libel and the Defense of Qualified Privilege
In an area of the law that has seen little litigation, the Fourth
Circuit held in Casale v. Donner Laboratories, Inc.29 5 that "the dis-
trict judge [had] erred in submitting to the jury determination of
whether the alleged libel was made upon a privileged occasion.
'296
The plaintiff in this case had been employed as a drug representative
and salesman by the William S. Merrell Company for a number of
years. The defendant offered the plaintiff a higher salary and more
substantial company benefits, and as a consequence, the plaintiff
changed jobs. The plaintiff was subsequently fired by the defendant
for allegedly "ineffective salesmanship."' 7 The plaintiff claimed that
he was unable to find new employment as a drug representative and
salesman because he had been "blackballed" by the various pharma-
ceutical companies within the Washington area due to libelous mate-
rial contained in a letter written to the various pharmaceutical com-
panies by the defendant. Donner Laboratories raised the defense of
qualified privilege. The Fourth Circuit held that "[u]nder Maryland
law, where the facts are not in substantial dispute, as here, privilege
is initially a question of law to be decided by the court. '298 It further
stated that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence of malice
in order for the judge to send to the jury the question of qualified
privilege. In other words, malice must be proven to rebut the defense
of "qualified privilege." The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district
court should have granted the defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict.
29
21Id. at 375. Judge Butzner dissented in this case and felt that under Virginia law
"the manufacture [sic] of a product, which-though not dangerous in itself-becomes
dangerous when it is used in its customary or ordinary manner, owes a duty of reasona-
ble care to any person who might foreseeably be injured because of the product's
negligent design or manufacture." Id.
2"No. 72-2180 (4th Cir., July 13, 1973).
2"Id. at 8.
21Id. at 2.
"'Id. at 8.
2"Id.
19741
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C. Tort Claims Act
In an important decision in the area of governmental tort liability,
the court held in Garrett v. Jeffcoat30 that the cumulative effect of
the Federal Drivers Act 01 and United States v. Gilman32 "is to make
the United States solely liable for the negligent acts of its servants
while operating motor vehicles within the scope of their employment
and that there is no cause of action whatever against the employee
himself. ":113:
Prior to the passage of the Federal Drivers Act, there was much
confusion among the circuits as to whether the government could be
held liable for the negligent operation of automobiles by its employ-
ees.131" Even after passage of the Act, a Tenth Circuit case maintained
its pre-Act position that the United States is immune from liability
for the automobile accidents of its employees while driving in the
course of their employment.305 However, in holding the government
liable in Jeffcoat the Fourth Circuit explained that the Federal Driv-
ers Act was designed "to relieve Government employees of the burden
of personal liability for accidents which occurred on the job.30 6
In a malpractice suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act,30 Portis
v. United States, 3 8 the court ruled that the statute of limitations
39
as applied to the plaintiff's loss of hearing "began to run in 1969
when, for the first time, a doctor ascribed [the plaintiff's] deafness
to the 1963 malpractice, and that accordingly, the suit was timely
begun. . . . ",1 The court analogized this position to its earlier deci-
sion in Young v. Clinchfield R.R. 31' In Young, the court determined
-483 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1973).
"28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)-(e) (1970).
302347 U.S. 507 (1954).
m483 F.2d at 593 (emphasis in original).
30'E.g., Munson v. United States, 380 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1967); Land v. United
States, 231 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Okla. 1964), aff'd per curiam 342 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.
1965).
"'Scoggin v. United States, 444 F.2d 74 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
"'422 F.2d at 593, citing Carr v. United States, 422 F.2d 1007, 1009 (4th Cir. 1970).
-28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
"'483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973).
30928 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1966) provides in part:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred
unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency
within two years after such claim accrues. ...
This is the section as amended in 1966. The revision does not affect this case, however,
since the amendment did not alter the substance of the two-year limitation.
"'483 F.2d at 671.
3"288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961).
